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THE DEMISE OF THE INTRA-ENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY
DOCTRINE: FLEXIBLE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
POLICY ABANDONED IN A MAZE OF ECONOMIC
CERTAINTY-Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104
S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.1 the United States
Supreme Court held that corporations and their wholly owned subsidiaries
cannot conspire and, thus, cannot violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.2
The decision signals an important shift in interpretation of the Sherman
Act. Before Copperweld, corporations and their wholly owned subsidiaries
were subject to conspiratorial liability under the Act.3 The Supreme Court
had recognized intra-enterprise conspiracies on at least six occasions.4
Despite their diverging views on how broadly the doctrine was to be
interpreted, the federal courts of appeals had unanimously applied the
doctrine. 5
The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine has generated much commen-
tary. Most of the commentary has focused on the inconsistency inherent in
holding parent corporations and their subsidiaries liable while not extend-
ing liability to corporations and their divisions.6 The inconsistency is
criticized because the form of corporate organization bears little, if any,
relationship to a firm's ability to restrain trade.7
1. 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
2. Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section I declares illegal "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations."
3. See, e.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218,227 (1947) (common ownership and
control of corporations does not preclude a finding of combination or conspiracy under the Sherman
Act); see also infra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
4. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968); Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram &Sons, Inc., 340U.S. 211,215 (1951); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v.
United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 109 (1947); Schine
Chain Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 116 (1947); see also United- States v. Crescent
Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 183-84 (1944) (charging § 1 conspiracy and, alternatively, § 2
monopoly). But see Areeda, Intraenterprise Conspiracy In Decline, 97 HARv. L. REv. 451, 457-62
(1983) (suggesting that the intra-enterprise doctrine was not responsible for the result reached in many
of these cases).
5. For a summary of the various approaches to the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, see
Handler & Smart, The Present Status of the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine, 3 CARDOZO L. REv.
23, 39-61 (1981). See also infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
7. As the majority noted in Copperweld, "there is nothing inherently anticompetitive about a
corporation's decision to create a subsidiary." 104 S. Ct. at 2743. Rather, a firm's ability to restrain
trade is a function of its market power or the market power that it shares with others through cartel
arrangements. Id. at 2752 (Stevens, J., dissenting). If the firm does not have a significant degree of
market power it cannot "unreasonably" restrain trade, because pressure from its competitors will force
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This debate over the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine has clouded the
true issue. By merely identifying the inconsistent application of the doc-
trine, the debate has failed to address two fundamental questions: first,
whether it is desirable to control what is essentially single-firm conduct;
and second, if it is desirable, whether the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine is an appropriate control mechanism.
In Copperweld, the Court resolved the previously inconsistent approach
without explicitly addressing the two fundamental questions. The Court
freed corporations and their divisions and subsidiaries from antitrust scru-
tiny by adopting a per se rule of nonliability under section 1.8
The Court implicitly addressed the two fundamental questions underly-
ing section 1 analysis, however, by rejecting alternative ways of resolving
the intra-enterprise inconsistency. 9 This Note suggests that the Copperweld
Court implicitly concluded that it is desirable to police single-firm conduct
only when such conduct violates the monopoly provisions of section 2. 10
The Note examines the assumptions and rationales that underlie this
conclusion, and challenges the persuasiveness of such assumptions in light
of the specific fact pattern presented in Copperweld. Specifically, this Note
challenges the "efficiency" interpretation of the Sherman Act adopted by
the Court.
Additionally, this Note questions whether a narrow interpretation of the
"restraint of trade" provision remains faithful to the broad and flexible
nature of section 1 as previously interpreted by the Supreme Court. The
Note suggests that the complex philosophical and political presumptions
it to adopt a competitive stance. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 463, table 25-1 (11th ed. 1980) (the
degree of control that a firm is able to exercise over pricing decisions is a function of the size of its
market share and differentiation of its products).
8. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. Many commentators have urged the Court to
adopt this solution. See, e.g., Handler & Smart, supra note 5, at 72-75.
9. The Court could have resolved the inconsistency by applying the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine to both forms of corporate organization and looking to the reasonableness of the challenged
action on a case by case basis. If both corporate forms were subject to § I conspiratorial liability, the
antitrust laws would not favor one form over another and the inconsistency would be resolved. The
Court, by adopting a per se rule of nonliability, necessarily concluded either that it is not desirable to
reach single-firm conduct previously reached with the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, or that the
doctrine is an inappropriate means for reaching such conduct.
Several commentators have urged that intra-enterprise conspiracies be extended to intra-corporate
dealings, but this has historically been the minority position. See, e.g., Kessler & Stem, Competition,
Contract and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1, 90 (1959). Contra ATTORNEY GENERAcS NAT'L
COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT at 31 (1955) (rejecting the extension of intra-enterprise
conspiracy to corporations and their officers or divisions) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
REP.].
10. Sherman Antitrust Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Section 2 provides: "Every person who
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons,
to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall
be deemed guilty of a felony ....
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that underlie antitrust analysis are essentially concerns for the legislature
and not the courts. The Court, therefore, must make these critical presump-
tions explicitly and not disguise them in a circuitous maze of economic
certainty.
The Note proposes, in conclusion, that a rule of reason test, incorporat-
ing an open balancing of policy objectives, is a more appropriate tool for
assessing the reasonableness of restraints of trade by corporations and their
subsidiaries or divisions. Congress should prescribe a flexible rule of
reason test to preserve legislative review of these crucial policy choices.
I. SECTION ONE INTRA-ENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY
DOCTRINE BEFORE COPPERWELD
Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares illegal "[e]very contract, com-
bination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations." I " Nothing
in the literal meaning of section 1 requires that the contract, combination,
or conspiracy involve two separate corporations or two separate economic
entities, although two parties are required. 12 Before Copperweld, the
Supreme Court had held that corporations and their wholly-owned subsidi-
aries constituted two separate actors for section 1 purposes.13 The Court
had not addressed the related question of whether a corporation and its
divisions, officers, or directors constituted two separate actors. 14
A. The Early Application of the Doctrine
The seminal case regarding intra-enterprise conspiracy is United States
v. Yellow Cab Co. 15 In Yellow Cab, the Court noted that a restraint of trade
could be produced as easily by affiliated or integrated corporations as by
independent corporations. 16 The corporate form was not determinative of
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1(1982).
12. Two parties, however delineated, are required by the plain meaning of the terms "contract,"
"combination," and "conspiracy." As the court in Copperweld observed, however, there is no
requirement within the statte's plain meaning that the two parties be separate economic entities. 104 S.
Ct. at 2741.
13. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
14. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2741-42 & nn.15-17. The Court had previously left the issue
unresolved. See, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 469 n.4 (1962).
15. 332 U.S. 218 (1947). In Yellow Cab, the Government charged Morris Markin and several taxi
manufacturing and operating corporations that he owned in part with a conspiracy to restrain trade in
purchasing cabs and providing cab services. By insisting that the cab operating companies purchase
cabs exclusively from the subsidiary corporation (Cab Sales), Checker Cab Manufacturing was able to
exclude all other manufacturers from 86% of the Chicago market, 15% of the New York market, 100%
of the Pittsburgh market, and 58% of the Minneapolis market. Id. at 224.
16. Id. at 227.
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conspiratorial capacity. 17 The Court, using a rule of reason approach,
emphasized that the rationale behind the Sherman Act was the prevention
of unreasonable restraints of trade. 18 Distinctions between corporate inter-
relationships were merely formal, and did not outweigh the Act's substan-
tive concerns.
B. A Critical Response
The Yellow Cab decision has elicited mostly critical commentary. 19
Some critics argue that a parent and subsidiary do not constitute the "two
actors" that section 1 contemplates. 20 Others argue that separate incorpora-
tion has no significance for antitrust law and should be rejected as a tool for
measuring conspiratorial capacity.2'
Critics of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine suggest that section 1
conspiratorial capacity is premised only upon Congress' desire to encour-
age and preserve independent centers of initiative. 22 Yet a conspiracy
17, Id.
18. Id. "The test of illegality under the Act is the presence or absence of an unreasonable restraint
on interstate commerce."
19. For a partial listing of commentaries critical of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine see
Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2739-40 n. 12.
The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine has supporters as well. Some commentators urge that the
doctrine be extended to intra-corporate dealings. Kessler & Stern, supra note 9, at 90. Others are
content to accept the inconsistency involved in extending liability to subsidiaries but not to corporate
divisions. The doctrine's supporters note that enforcement of the principles of the Sherman Act in one
case is preferable to eliminating liability for the sake of consistency. See Barndt, Two Trees or One?-
The Problem of Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, 23 MONT. L. REV. 158, 198 (1962).
The doctrine's advocates assert that substantive principles should govern the antitrust laws. The
substance of § 1, according to these supporters, is the prevention of unreasonable restraints of trade that
are not justified by efficiency considerations. See Kramer, Does Concerted Action Solely Between a
Corporation and Its Officers Acting on Its Behalf in Unreasonable Restraint of Interstate Commerce
Violate Section ] of the Sherman Act?, II FED. B.J. 130, 141-42 (1951). Underlying this argument is the
premise that the Sherman Act is intended to promote the free movement of goods in competitive
markets. Barndt, supra, at 198 n.28 1. Moreover, the advocates of the doctrine are much less likely than
its critics to view single firm restraints of trade as efficiency inducing. Efficiency gains are to be
weighed in light of other competitive concerns in a "rule of reason" context. See Comment, Intra-
Enterprise Conspiracy under the Sherman Act, 63 YALE L.J. 372, 387-88 (1954).
20. See, e.g., Sprunk, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, 9 A.B.A. ANTrrRUST SECTION REP. 20, 26
(1956) (suggesting that separate legal incorporation cannot alone provide two actors for § I liability).
21. Corporations choose subsidiary forms for many legitimate business reasons that do not relate to
the corporation's ability to restrain trade. See Handler & Smart, supra note 5, at 62-63; McQuade,
Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises, and Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 41 VA. L. REv. 183, 186
(1955). However, the recognition that corporate form does not affect a firm's ability to restrain trade
does not imply that single entities are incapable of restraining trade. This would, of course, depend on
the degree of market power possessed by the firm. See supra note 7.
22. See Handler & Smart, supra note 5, at 72-73; McQuade, supra note 20, at 185; Note, Intra-
Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: A Suggested Standard, 75 MICH. L. REV.
717, 737 (1977). The preservation of independent decisionmakers ensures that the market will allocate
resources to the most efficient firms since prices will be set through competition. When decisionmakers
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between parent and subsidiary corporations does not involve the combina-
tion of previously independent decisionmakers. These critics view the two
corporations as a single economic unit pursuing profit maximization for the
corporation as a whole.
Critics of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine also disapprove of the
doctrine because they believe that closely integrated enterprises afford
economies of scale that offset any gains that might be realized by division
and competition. 23 They argue that the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine
discourages subsidiaries as a form of corporate organization and thereby
misallocates corporate resources. 24 Critics see the inefficiencies that result
as inimical to the purposes of the Sherman Act.
In addition, the critics fear that the doctrine would be manipulated by
overzealous attorneys and courts, and extended to virtually all corporate
planning activity.25 They believe that section 1 per se liability (for certain
inherently anticompetitive activities) and intra-enterprise conspiracy could
be combined to create de facto conspiracies in normal business planning
activities.26 Because of this fear, critics have developed various limiting
tests for intra-enterprise conspiracy or have repudiated the doctrine al-
together.27
collude they can manipulate price and supply to obtain monopoly profits.
23. See Handler & Smart, supra note 5, at 62-63, 73; McQuade, supra note 21, at 185, 215.
These economies of scale can, however, be realized in one corporate form as easily as another, unless
it is assumed that one corporate form is more readily adaptable to specialization of function or division
of labor. See, e.g., P. SAMUELSON, supra note 7, at 25 (listing factors responsible for this phenomenon).
Moreover, a concern about independent decisionmakers mistakes the purpose of § I intra-enterprise
conspiracy theory by assuming that this theory is meant to make parent and subsidiary compete with
one another. The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine historically has been used only to prevent parent
and subsidiary from coercively restraining the trade of outsiders. See ATrORNEY GENERALS REP., supra
note 9, at 34-35. The firm, in other words, is not asked to compete with itself but only to refrain from
actions that unreasonably restrain competition. This interpretation of the statute recognizes that it is not
the conspiracy itself that is objectionable (a firm conspires with its subsidiaries when it makes pricing
decisions), but rather it is the effect of the conspiracy that makes the conspiracy objectionable.
24. McQuade, supra note 21, at 186; Willis & Pitofsky, Antitrust Consequences of Using Corporate
Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 20, 28 (1968). This argument assumes, of course, that one form of
corporate organization is more efficient than the other in certain contexts. Moreover, this argument
assumes that the risks and costs of intra-enterprise conspiratorial liability outweigh the benefits of
separate incorporation. If the benefits are substantial, as claimed, it seems unlikely that the doctrine
could have had a substantial effect on the allocation of corporate resources. Any effect on the
distribution of corporate resources would occur at the margin; only firms with a high probability of
antitrust liability or a potentially large antitrust penalty would be affected.
25. Handler & Smart, supra note 5, at 38-39; Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 24, at 29-30, 34-35.
26. This fear seems irrational in light of the Supreme Court's approach to intra-enterprise
conspiracy. The Supreme Court had always analyzed these conspiracies in a rule of reason context.
Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2746 (Stevens, L, dissenting). Additionally, many commentators have urged
that the intra-enterprise conspiracies be analyzed under a rule of reason. See, e.g., Kessler & Stem,
supra note 9, at 90; ArroRNEY GENERAL's REP., supra note 9, at 34-35 (urging application of intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine only in cases of coercive restraint on third parties).
27. For a summary of several of the limiting proposals suggested see Comment, All in the Family:
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C. The Judicial Response
In response to the criticism generated by the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine, several of the federal courts of appeals adopted limitations on the
doctrine. The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits applied a fact-specific
single entity limitation, using the doctrine only when the parent and
subsidiary corporations were not acting as a coordinated whole. 28 In
contrast, the First, Third, and Fifth Circuits broadly applied the doctrine in
tandem with the traditional section 1 rule of reason analysis. 29
II. COPPERWELD: THE CHALLENGED ACTIONS AND THEIR
EFFECTS
The antitrust violations asserted in Copperweld were triggered by the
actions of the Copperweld Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary,
Regal Tube Corporation. In 1972, Copperweld purchased Regal, a steel
tube manufacturer, from the Lear Siegler Corporation. The contract of sale
included a noncompetition agreement. 30 David Grohne, an employee of
Lear Siegler who was not bound by the noncompetition agreement, at-
tempted to establish his own steel tubing business, Independence Tube
Corporation. 31 Copperweld and Regal, through various means, attempted
to stop Independence from entering the steel tubing market.
During 1972 and 1973, Mr. Grohne contacted several banks and sup-
pliers of both steel products and manufacturing equipment. 32 Throughout
this same period Copperweld, in conjunction with Regal, wrote to these
potential financiers and suppliers and warned that Copperweld was
"greatly concerned" with Mr. Grohne's contemplated entry into the struc-
tural tube market in competition with Regal. 33 The letters threatened to take
When Will Internal Discussion Be Labeled Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy?, 14 DuQ. L. REv. 63, 69-87
(1975); see also Handler & Smart, supra note 5, at 72-75 (the doctrine should be "jettisoned").
28. See Handler & Smart, supra note 5, at 38-39. The single entity limitation has been criticized
because of its internal inconsistency; namely, evidence of collusion between a parent and subsidiary
indicates close integration that, under a single entity defense, exempts the firm from § I scrutiny. See
Areeda, supra note 4, at 464.
29. See Handler & Smart, supra note 5, at 38-39.
30. Copperiveld, 104 S. Ct. at 2734.
31. Id. at 2734-45.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2734. Copperweld and Regal sent these letters on several occasions. Copperweld wrote to
the machinery supplier on three occasions during 1973. See Record at app. 454, Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984). The parent and subsidiary also contacted the
president of the secondary supplier on three occasions during this period. See id. at app. 624-26. When
Copperweld realized that Mr. Grohne was attempting to lease land in an industrial park, Copperweld's
president wrote letters to all potential lessors. See id. at app. 575-78. Finally, on several occasions
Regal sent letters to representatives of U.S. Steel informing them that "[ilt is a source of great concern
to Regal Tube. . .to find that. . .Independence Tube. . .is receiving shipments of steel from your
Vol. 60:757, 1985
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"any and all steps" necessary to protect Copperweld's rights under its
purchase agreement with Lear.34 A supplier that had agreed to provide
Independence with manufacturing equipment voided its agreement as a
result of these threats. Independence was able to secure another supplier,
but its entry into the steel tubing market was delayed by nine months. 35
The trial court held Copperweld liable for conspiracy under section 1 and
the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment.3 6 The Supreme Court reversed
the finding of conspiratorial capacity. 37 The Court held that a parent
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiaries are legally incapable, under
section 1 of the Sherman Act, of conspiring with each other.38
The Court's decision was obviously influenced by the critical commen-
taries discussed above. 39 The Court adopted the view that section 1 conspir-
acy doctrine is premised only upon the desire to preserve independent
centers of initiative.40 The Court emphasized that a conspiracy between
parent and subsidiary corporations does not involve a combination of
previously independent decisionmakers.41 The Court expressed its belief
that these corporations, if unfettered by unreasonable interference, could
generate significant efficiency gains. The intra-enterprise conspiracy doc-
trine had, according to the Court, unreasonably reduced the competitive
zeal of aggressive entrepreneurs and thereby encouraged inefficiency. 42 In
addition, the doctrine had misallocated corporate resources and deprived
consumers of the benefits of decentralized management. 43
In an effort to cure these perceived shortcomings, the Court announced a
new test: section 1 requires that conspirators have distinct and diverse
economic interests before conspiratorial capacity is present. 44 Parent
Gary works." Id. at app. 758. There is also evidence that Copperweld and Regal telephoned at least one
of these suppliers and told the supplier that Copperweld was contemplating legal action against it. See
id. at app. 627.
34. Copperveld, 104 S. Ct. at 2734.
35. Id. at 2734-35.
36. Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310,313 (7th Cir. 1982). The Seventh
Circuit applied a fact-specific, single-entity limitation. Analyzing a variety of factors, the court
attempted to decide whether Copperweld and Regal were one entity or two for § I conspiracy purposes.
The appellate court concluded that the trial court was justified in holding that Regal and Copperweld did
not constitute one actor for § I purposes. Id. at 320. This fact-specific analysis has been criticized by
some commentators. See supra note 28.
37. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2745.
38. Id.
39. See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
40. 104 S. Ct. at 2741. See also supra note 22.
41. 104 S. Ct. at2741.
42. Id. at 2740, 2742. The Court apparently linked these efficiency benefits with the form of
corporate organization (for example, decentralized management), rather than with the size of the firm.
Id. at 2742 (divisions have "presumed benefits" and decentralized management creates efficiency).
43. Id. at 2742; see also infra note 52.
44. 104 S. Ct. at 2740 (§ I reaches "separate entities"). "[T]he ultimate interests of the subsidiary
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corporations and their subsidiaries, which are a "single enterprise," can-
not alone violate section 1.
III. ANALYSIS: A DECISION TO LIMIT ANTITRUST SCRUTINY
OF SINGLE-FIRM RESTRAINTS OF TRADE
The Copperweld decision, in addition to explicitly rejecting the doctrine
underlying Yellow Cab and its progeny, implicitly rejects the result of these
previous cases. This signals a fundamental shift in the Court's interpreta-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court states that the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine is merely an inappropriate control mecha-
nism. However, the Court implicitly concludes that it is no longer desirable
to control the types of conduct previously reached with the doctrine. The
following section analyzes four aspects of the Court's decision that reveal
this fundamental shift in section 1 interpretation.
A. The Indicia of an Intent to Lessen Antitrust Scrutiny of Single-Firm
Restraints of Trade
Several factors indicate a shift towards less intensive scrutiny of single-
firm restraints of trade. First, the Court asserted that alternative antitrust
provisions are appropriate for suppressing anticompetitive single-firm be-
havior. However, it then failed to assess the likelihood of prosecution under
these provisions. 45 The Court's rejection of the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine is not contingent on the availability of other control mechanisms.
Some commentators believe that the other statutory provisions suggested
by the Court are not acceptable alternatives. 46 If these commentators are
and the parent are identical, so the parent and subsidiary must be viewed as a single economic unit." Id.
at 2743 n.18; see also United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 305 (1919) (Colgate's unilateral
decision not to sell to wholesalers not in violation of § 1).
45. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2745 ("[a]ny anticompetitive activities . ..may be policed
adequately without resort to an intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine"). The Court asserted that § 7 of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982), and § 5 ofthe Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1982), could be used, in addition to § 2 of the Sherman Act, to police parent and subsidiary conduct.
Id.
46. See, e.g., Comment, The Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Doctrine: Toward an Equitable Ap-
proach, 33 DE PAUL L. REV. 105, 145-46 (1983). The § 2 monopoly provisions require proof of
monopoly power or an attempt to monopolize. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Courts applying this provision
require a particular concentration-ratio within an industry to prove a monopoly. The Supreme Court has
held that the "attempt" provision of § 2 requires a showing of specific intent and a dangerous
probability of success. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 718,785 (1946); Swift v.
United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905). This treatment of § 2 ignores the fact that monopoly power
may be exercised in varying degrees. Thus, section 2 does not reach restraints of trade by single firms
that possess a degree of monopoly power less than the required concentration-ratio. See ANTITRUST
SECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 141-42 (2d ed. 1984) (predatory
tactics by firms unlikely to achieve monopoly power not within reach of § 2). Furthermore, the Clayton
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correct, the practical effect of the Court's decision is to create a "gap" in
antitrust enforcement. 47 That is, there are no longer any provisions that can
be effectively used to reach unreasonable single-firm restraints of trade not
involving a monopoly or an attempt to monopolize. 48
Second, the Copperweld Court rejected a doctrine proven to be effective
for fighting single-firm restraints of trade. The, Court concluded that the
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine was not necessary to the results of
previous cases. 49 This conclusion is doubtful. In one previous decision, for
example, the alternative grounds of liability were not available for the Court
to use. 50 In addition, the Court erroneously assumes that it is as easy to
prosecute and prove violations under these alternative theories as it is under
a theory of intra-enterprise conspiracy.51 Moreover, even if prosecution
would have resulted under the particular circumstances presented in these
cases, a flexible restraint of trade provision is valuable because it deters the
development of new forms of trade restraints.
Third, the Court's emphasis on the efficiency losses caused by intra-
enterprise conspiratorial liability reveals that it elected to relax antitrust
scrutiny of single-firm conduct. The Court identified two distinct forms of
efficiency gains that it believed would be realized if the doctrine were
abandoned. First, the Court asserted that the threat of section 1 antitrust
liability for subsidiaries could encourage corporations to organize into
divisions instead of subsidiaries even if this form is inefficient. 52 The Court
Act and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act will likely prove ineffective. See Comment, supra at
145-46. The FTC Act lacks the deterrent power of § 1 because it does not allow private actions or treble
damage awards. In addition, it exempts entire industries and is susceptible to political manipulation.
The Clayton Act provisions may well be "too specialized to provide an adequate substitute for the more
comprehensive Sherman Act." Id. at 146. Some commentators argue that the gap was intentional. See,
e.g., Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 24, at 22 (single enterprise conduct may fall between §§ 1 and 2).
47. The Court in Copperweld recognized this gap but asserted that the size of the gap is "open to
serious question." Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2745.
48. Unreasonable single-firm restraints of trade not actionable as monopolies or attempts to
monopolize are per se legal unless some other provision of the antitrust laws is applicable. Indeed, some
commentators have argued that the intra-enterprise conspiracies were merely a judicial attempt to fill
this gap. See, e.g., Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 24, at 22; Note, supra note 22, at 717-19.
49. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2745.
50. The Copperveld Court concluded that the same result could have been reached in Kiefer-
Stewart v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951), under an alternative conspiracy
theory. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2738 n.9. This theory, however, was not available at the time. This is
one example of how objectionable conduct could, in the absence of a flexible antitrust theory, go
unprosecuted simply because the courts do not have a recognized label for the conduct.
51. Actions brought under § I "have strategic and procedural advantages over other forms of
antitrust relief, including criminal penalties, treble damages, private actions, avoidance of market
analysis, and elimination of certain defenses." Comment, supra note 46, at 146 (footnotes omitted).
52. See Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2741 ("Coordination within a firm is as likely to result from an
effort to compete as from an effort to stifle competition. In the marketplace, such coordination may be
necessary if a business enterprise is to compete effectively."). Discouraging the divisional form "could
well deprive consumers of the efficiencies that decentralized management may bring." Id. at 2742. The
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intended, by rejecting the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, to end any
judicial influence on the allocation of corporate resources. 53
In addition, the Court expected that a further efficiency gain would result
if firms were free to pursue their competitive instincts. In the free market,
the efficient firm captures customers from its inefficient rivals who will
eventually be driven from the market. According to the Court, subjecting
parents and their subsidiaries to section 1 liability had preserved inefficient
competitors by dampening the competitive zeal of aggressive entrepre-
neurs. 
54
Since the Court expressly recognized that single-firm behavior may be
anticompetitive, 55 its decision reveals a preference for an efficient though
potentially uncompetitive market. Not surprisingly, the Court avoided
explicitly making this difficult policy decision. The Court instead declared
that Congress had made this fundamental choice when it drafted the
Sherman Act. 56 This assertion is questionable because the wording of
section 1 is ambiguous, 57 and since the Court did not analyze the legislative
history of section 1 to find evidence of this choice. Moreover, this inter-
pretation of the Sherman Act repudiates prior Court pronouncements on
the proper interpretation of section 1.58
same rationale applies to parent and subsidiary corporations. Id.
53. The Court could have cured the misallocation of corporate resources, if indeed there is any such
phenomenon, by extending liability to divisions rather than by eliminating the intra-enterprise conspir-
acy altogether. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
54. The Court stated:
[B]ecause it is sometimes difficult to distinguish robust competition from conduct with long-run
anti-competitive effects, Congress authorized Sherman Act scrutiny of single firms only when
they pose a danger of monopolization. Judging unilateral conduct in this manner reduces the risk
that the antitrust laws will dampen the competitive zeal of a single aggressive entrepreneur.
Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2740.
55. Id. at 2744. This Note uses the term "competition" in its commonly understood sense: a market
situation in which market pricing and production decisions are determined through "rivalry" with other
firms in the market. This definition assumes nothing about the economic efficiency of the firms in the
industry. Thus, it is possible that a firm obtaining market power through its own efficiency gains may
also use that power to unreasonably restrain trade through anticompetitive tactics. Anticompetitive
tactics are tactics that eliminate rivalry and do not promote efficient production or efficient allocation of
resources.
56. Id. at 2745. This interpretation of § I is supported by Judge Robert Bork, a proponent of the
use of economic analysis in antitrust law. R. BORK, THE ANTrrrusT PARADOX 15-71 (1978). Butsee infra
notes 67-71.
57. The language of § 1 does not reveal a congressional preference for efficiency. Neither does it
explicitly apply only to distinct economic entities. See supra notes 11-13.
58. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 57 (3d ed. 1981) (the purpose and function of the Act
could not have been accomplished if the courts had interpreted the Sherman Act narrowly); see, e.g.,
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1932) (The Sherman Act is a "charter
of freedom" and is to have a "generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in
constitutional provisions." The Act's phrases are to be interpreted flexibly enough to frustrate all efforts
to unreasonably restrain trade); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911) (the classes
within§ I were intended "to embrace every conceivable contract or combination which could be made
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Finally, other recent antitrust decisions reveal the Court's intention to
substantially decrease the threat of antitrust prosecution by limiting the
scope of the antitrust laws. 59 Several commentators have noted that this
development has paralleled the rising influence of economic analysis,
especially Chicago-style economics, in antitrust enforcement. 60
B. A Critical Analysis of the Rationale for Exempting Single Firm
Restraints of Trade from Section One Scrutiny
Two implicit premises underlie the conclusion that the antitrust laws
should not reach single firm "gap" behavior. The first premise implicit in
the Copperweld decision is that efficiency is the only criterion for judging
Sherman Act violations. The second premise is that a successful firm's
behavior is inherently and necessarily efficient and that government inter-
ference can only distort the naturally efficient market outcome. Both of
these premises, however, are open to challenge.
1. The Efficiency Interpretation: An Impermissibly Narrow
Interpretation of Congressional Intent
Promoting consumer welfare is universally accepted as the goal of the
Sherman Act.61 Authorities disagree, however, about how to achieve this
goal. 62 Some commentators believe that the best way to promote consumer
welfare is to maximize the gross national product. 63 This theory assumes
concerning trade" and courts must keep apace of evolving restraints of trade); see also United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F2d 416, 427-29 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J) (Sherman Act expresses a
preference for atomistic markets and framer were motivated by social and moral concerns in addition
to economic concerns).
59. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service C6rp., 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984); Cantalano, Inc. v.
Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980); National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679
(1978) (professional societies); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977);
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (learned professions).
60. See Bickel, The Antitrust Division's Adoption of a Chicago SchootEconomic Policy Calls for
Some Reorganization: But is the Division's New Policy Here to Stay?, 20 Hous. L. REv. 1083, 1086-87
(1983) (the "Antitrust Division personnel are now following policy set forth in Robert Bork's The
Antitrust Parodox and the writings of Richard Posner"); Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust
Analysis: The Near Triumph of the Chicago School, 1982 Sup. Cr. REv. 319, 319 (1982). But see Hay, Is
Antitrust Obsolete? A Forecast on the Role ofAntitrust Policy in the Eighties, CORNELL L.F. Feb. 1982,
at 2, 6 (despite a change in the underlying enforcement philosophy, it is not'likely that a significant
relaxation of antitrust enforcement will occur).
61. See R. GIVENs, ANTrRUSTi: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH § 2.01, at 2-6 (1984).
62. See, e.g., Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 67-70 (1982) (the primary method of
promoting consumer welfare is through wealth redistribution not the pursuit of efficiency). Contra R.
BORK, supra note 56, at 90 (consumer welfare is maximized when prosperity is maximized, without
regard to the resulting income distribution).
63. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 56, at 90-91.
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that an action that improves efficiency perfects societal use of scarce
resources by increasing gross national product. 64 Thus, business action
should be judged reasonable or unreasonable depending solely upon
whether it is efficient. The proponents of this statutory interpretation argue
that the Sherman Act should not punish an efficient firm's activity even if
that firm eliminates some or all business rivalry through means unrelated to
its superior efficiency.65 The Supreme Court adopted this efficiency inter-
pretation of the Sherman Act in Copperweld.66
The efficiency interpretation is deficient for three distinct reasons. First, it
ignores distributional effects, which are a primary concern of the Sherman
Act. Second, it ignores goals, other than efficiency, that are primarily politi-
cal in nature. Finally, efficiency is often hard to quantify 67 and is therefore
inappropriate as a sole or primary goal of the legislation since the courts are
ill-suited to the task of measuring and comparing such illusive quantities.
Essential to the first criticism is the belief that Congress intended, by
favoring competitive markets, to apportion to consumers the entire surplus
income68 generated by competition. This interpretation is consistent with
64. Id. The efficiency goal is a shorthand expression for two distinct goals: the proper allocation of
available resources among industries (allocative efficiency) and the effective use of resources within
each industry (productive efficiency).
65. See, e.g., id. at 134-35 ("[Tlhe agreed elimination of rivalry and the infliction of injury upon
rivals are not merely means of injuring the competitive process; they are, even more importantly, means
by which productive efficiency is created and by which the forces of competition allocate resources.").
66. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
67. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
68. The consumer surplus is generated because some consumers are willing to pay more than the
market price in order to receive a good. The surplus is the sum of the amounts by which the prices that all
consumers would pay for the good exceed the price that is actually charged for the good. Graphically, this
surplus of imputed income is the area under the demand curve but above the supply curve. In a purely
competitive market this surplus is maximized because prices are driven to the lowest profitable level.
Triangle A*B*C, depicted below, represents the consumer surplus in a purely competitive market.
Vol. 60:757, 1985
Demise of Intra-Enterprise Doctrine
the protectionist nature of the legislation. 69 When an efficient firm obtains a
degree of monopoly power, it will raise the market price above the prevail-
ing price if it can do so without losing market power. This transfers a
portion of the consumer surplus to producers and wastes another portion.70
If one views consumers and producers as generally distinct interest groups,
a distributional change has occurred that is antithetical to the Sherman
Act's intent.71
This interpretation is also based on the presumption that efficiency and
income equality are often mutually exclusive or inconsistent goals. The
efficient firm that gains a significantly large market share can control
pricing decisions by restricting its output or threatening its rivals. It can,
therefore, control the allocation of the consumer surplus and divert the
surplus to itself. Income inequality can result.72
69. See Lande, supra note 62, at 70 (consumers' surplus was a "rightful entitlement of consumers"
under the Sherman Act).
70. When markets are not competitive one firm may be able to restrict output and consumers may
lose a portion of the surplus. The lost surplus is reflected in the following graph:
$AS
Q<-- Q, IO
When the firm restricts output from Q, to Q2 the price level rises from P to P2. The consumer surplus
(originally triangle A*E*G) is reduced to triangle A*B*C. Rectangle B*C*D*E represents the portion
of the surplus that is transferred to producers. Triangle C*D*G represents the portion of the surplus that
is lost. Triangle D*F*G represents an efficiency loss to producers, but they are benefited on the whole if
this loss is less than the portion of consumer surplus transferred to them. For a more complete
explanation, see J. HIRscHLEmFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 212-24 (2d ed. 1980); P. SAM-
UEMLSON, supra note 7, at 486 n.6; Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GFo.
WASH. L. Rnv. 1, 10-14 & n.51 (1982).
71. Lande, supra note 62, at 74-77. But see R. BoRK, supra note 56, at 90, 110 (the antitrust laws
should not be concerned with the distribution of wealth since producers are consumers and any transfer
of income to them benefits the "collectivity" of consumers).
72. See Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other than Competition and Efficiency, What Else
Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1194 (1977) (this tradeoff is "well-known"). The decrease in
rivalrous competition is the result of increasing market concentrations held by the largest and most
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Even assuming that the efficiency gains generated by economies of scale
are passed to consumers rather than captured by the producers, society as a
whole may be willing to forego the benefits of these economies in order to
preserve competitive markets. This is a possibility that the Copperweld
Court fails to acknowledge. The efficiency interpretation, in other words,
naively and deceptively emphasizes the unwillingness of consumers to pay
a market premium for societal welfare. 73 Society as a whole has chosen
through the political and legislative process to preserve these political and
economic freedoms. The fact that consumers are individually unwilling to
pay a premium to preserve these freedoms (by purchasing the more costly
goods of less efficient producers) should not denigrate the value of these
freedoms.74
The antitrust laws are a charter of economic and political freedom. The
Court has, in the past, consistently acknowledged this. 75 Accordingly, the
pursuit of consumer welfare should incorporate the desire to limit aggrega-
tions of economic and political power.76 The antitrust laws should, more-
over, enhance individual freedom of opportunity that would otherwise be
threatened by large aggregations of wealth. 77 The political process, and not
market transactions, is the appropriate forum for deciding which goals will
promote consumer welfare. 78 The Court should not, therefore, invalidate its
past holdings without serious reflection.
2. The Competitive Market Assumption in Copperweld: Misguided
Faith in the Preachings of the Chicago School
The Copperweld decision implicitly relies upon the competitive market
model. This model consistently predicts efficiency gains from single-firm
efficient firms.
73. See Hovenkamp, supra note 70, at 10.
74. An efficiency interpretation assumes that the market outcome that consumers favor with their
pocketbooks is the societally preferred outcome. However, by transforming dollars into "votes" this
scheme discriminates against the poor who are given fewer "votes." Moreover, the efficiency inter-
pretation ignores the salient fact that the benefits of competitive markets are public goods that, if left to
the competitive market, would not be adequately provided.
75. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
76. For a discussion of the non-efficiency goals of the Sherman Act, see generally Blake & Jones,
In Defense ofAntitrust, 65 CoLuM. L. REv. 377 (1965); Lande, supra note 62, at 96-105; Pitofsky, The
Political Content ofAntitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1979). But see generally Bork & Bowman.
The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965).
77. Schwartz, Justice and Other Non-Economic Goals ofAntitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076, 1078
(1979) (the antitrust laws should pursue fairness and equal treatment); accord Appalachian Coals, Inc.
v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1932).
78. Contra R. BORK, supra note 56, at 90 ("Consumer welfare ... permits consumers to define
by their expression of wants in the marketplace what things they regard as wealth.").
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behavior.79 The Court's reliance is probably the result of the influence of
Chicago-style economics. 80 The reliability of this model's predictions
depends, however, upon the validity of the assumptions made in the
Chicago model.
The Chicago school's positions ' begins by assuming that promoting
efficiency is the primary goal of the Sherman Act.82 A more efficient use of
resources, even if it results in a less competitive market environment, is
never objectionable. Second, the Chicago school assumes that courts must
rely upon market modeling to predict and assess the effects of firm
behavior.83 Courts must rely upon theoretical models because economic
analysis cannot quantify the tradeoff between efficiency and competi-
tiveness. 84
Third, the Chicago school assumes that rational firms in competitive
markets will not engage in predatory tactics.85 Predatory tactics are more
expensive than merger as a means of eliminating rivalry. Therefore, merger
will always be preferred. This assumption is enormously important. It
eliminates all concern of unreasonable single-firm restraints of trade by
suggesting that, apart from monopoly activity, single-firm predatory acti-
vity does not exist. From this assumption flows an intermediate conclusion:
firms in competitive markets are able to exclude less efficient rivals only to
the extent that they are more efficient. 86
79. If the Court did not believe that the competitive model accurately predicts market con-
sequences, it would have adopted a rule of reason approach rather than a new perse rule of nonliability.
As the dissent notes in Copperweld, "[t]he Rule of Reason has always given the courts adequate latitude
to examine the substance rather than the form of an arrangement when answering the question whether
collective action has restrained competition within the meaning of § ." Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at
2746.
80. The Chicago school is noted for its xeliance on the static analysis of the purely competitive
market. See infra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
81. The most complete statement of the Chicago school position is found in R. BORuK, supra note
56. See generally Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 22 Copu. PRAC. COMMENTATOR
583 (1981).
82. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text; see also Bork & Bowman, supra note 76, at
365.
83. R. BORuK, supra note 56, at 95 ("[T]he model represents the ultimate situation toward which
economic forces tend to drive the firm."). But see id. at 92 (warning that such models can be misused).
84. See id. at 123. This predictive ability "is well beyond the present powers of economic analysis
and is likely forever to remain so." Id. If it is true that "[plassably accurate measurement of the actual
situation is not even a theoretical possibility," id. at 125, then the analysis should openly embrace other
noneconomic objectives.
85. Id. at 144-60. Bork's assertions are based upon the well-known study of the Standard Oil
litigation conducted by John S. McGee.
86. Id. at 137. Interestingly, Bork believes that "competitive effectiveness" is synonomous with
efficiency. Id. at 105-06. However, efficiency will lead to competitive effectiveness, but competitive
effectiveness is not always caused by efficiency. Competitive effectiveness can be the result of
monopoly power, predatory tactics or even collusion among firms.
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The school assumes, finally, that in most cases market forces naturally
and inexorably drive the firm and industry toward pure competition. 87
Competitive markets provide obvious advantages to consumers. By defini-
tion, each firm in a purely competitive market produces such a small
portion of the aggregate industry output that it cannot influence the market
supply in any significant manner, nor the price that it receives for its
goods. 88 All competitors, facing the same market price, will produce until
marginal cost and price are equal. 89
This competitive process equates social costs with social desires. The
process eliminates inefficient rivals within industries and determines the
relative resource allocations among industries. 90 Conversely, when mar-
kets are not purely competitive, social costs and social desires are no longer
in equilibrium and allocative inefficiency results. 91
This final assumption, that markets are driven to competitive equi-
librium, completes the circle. The obvious conclusion, having defined all
markets as purely competitive, is that superior efficiency of one firm is the
sole cause of another firm's exclusion from the marketplace. 92
87. Id. at 95. Theoretically, firms cannot avoid their Darwinian fate; they are forced to compete
with one another because of the ever present temptation for the most efficient firms to lower prices in
order to capture other firms' customers. This conclusion is reached by ignoring oligopoly theory, id. at
92, 180-83, collusion, id. at 175, and barriers to entry, id. at 195. The Chicago school believes that
resources are fluid and gravitate to the highest return. Firms cannot for long maintain an uncompetitive
stance while reaping abnormal profits; market forces will soon attract competition to bid away the
abnormal profits. Posner, supra note 81, at 585-87.
88. R. GIVENS, supra note 61, § 2.01, at 2-1; P. SAMUELSON, supra note 7, at 430; R. WARREN,
ANTITRUST IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 16-17 (1975). In the competitive market, firms are "price takers";
that is, they accept the price that the market has determined. If a firm is unwilling to charge this price, it
will not find buyers because other firms in the market are offering a sufficient supply at the lower price.
89. This occurs because a profit is made until the price of the last good is equal to the cost of
producing the good. If the price level exceeds marginal cost, firms in the industry are earning excess
profits, and new firms will enter the market to compete for these profits. As supply increases the price is
driven downward to the lowest profitable level. P. SAMUELSON, supra note 7, at 430--31; see also R.
WARREN, supra note 88, at 17 (cautioning that purely competitive markets do not exist in reality).
90. P. SAMUELSON, supra note 7, at 432-36; see also supra note 64. When competitive markets do
function as the model suggests, all consumers benefit. The societal use of scarce resources in the most
efficient manner leads to a state of so called "Pareto optimality." P. SAMUELSON, supra note 7, at 435
n.12, 591.
91. See R. BORK, supra note 56, at 101. On the contrary, if firms are not acting in purely
competitive markets, and if the market is not being driven towards competitive equilibrium, some firms
will be able to exclude other firms in ways unrelated to superior efficiency. P. SAMUELSON, supra note 7,
at 470-71 (the imperfect competitor contrives to keep his good in scarce supply-presumably by using
his market power to control pricing decisions).
92. As an alternative to the premise that predatory tactics do not occur, the Chicago school suggests
that predatory tactics create efficiency and allocate resources in the most efficient manner. See supra
note 65 and accompanying text. Therefore, even if predatory tactics exist, antitrust surveillance is
unwarranted since efficiency is seen as the primary goal of the Sherman Act. As this Note demon-
strates, predatory tactics do occur. See infra notes 94-106 and accompanying text. Moreover, the belief
that predatory tactics are not inconsistent with the goals of the Sherman Act conflicts with past
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The Chicago school concludes that a successful firm's conduct is ex-
clusively efficiency-inducing. The Court in Copperweld concludes, in a
similar vein, that single-firm conduct, at least within the gap between
conspiracy and monopoly, is efficiency-inducing and does not merit anti-
trust surveillance. 93 The Court's conclusion, therefore, is rooted in the
assumption that single firms are acting in competitive markets. An exam-
ination of the fact pattern presented in Copperweld, however, reveals the
weaknesses of this competitive market assumption. The exclusion of Inde-
pendence from the structural steel tubing market was unrelated to any
superior efficiency on the part of Regal.
Copperweld and Regal believed that they could control market pricing by
maintaining their market share. 94 This, of course, is contrary to the premise
that firms will exclude other firms from the market only by superior
efficiency. The trial record indicates that they had in fact successfully
controlled market pricing decisions for some time.95 To preserve the status
quo, these corporations attempted to preclude Independence from entering
the market altogether. 96 Eventually, however, Independence was able to
enter the market and lower prices on at least three occasions.97 Regal and
Copperweld resisted these changes and continued to rely on their past
interpretations by the Supreme Court. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. Such a radical
reinterpretation of the Sherman Act should be made explicitly, not implicitly as was done here. See
supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. Even though the Court acknowledges that
single firm activity not reaching monopoly proportions may be anticompetitive, Copperweld, 104 S. Ct.
at 2744, it either does not believe this to be true, or believes that it is of no significant consequence. This
is evidenced by the Court's treatment of other types of conspiracies.
Certain agreements . . . are thought so inherently anticompetitive that each is illegal per se
without inquiry into the harm it has actually caused. Other combinations. . . hold the promise of
increasing a firm's efficiency and enabling it to compete more effectively. Accordingly, such
combinations are judged under a rule of reason, an inquiry into market power and market structure
designed to assess the combination's actual effect.
Id. at 2740-41 (citations omitted). A combination that merits per se nonliability must be viewed, then,
as both efficiency inducing and not significantly anticompetitive. The decision to exempt single-firm
restraints of trade from all but § 2 scrutiny illustrates the Court's belief that, on balance, the "gap"
activity is more likely to be socially beneficial than socially harmful. This conclusion is, of course, at
odds with past intra-enterprise conspiracy cases.
94. Record at 2482, Copperweld (deposition of Mr. Philipp: "Q. Did Mr. Smith [Copperweld's
CEO] ever elaborate on how increase of market share would help Regal be a price leader? A. By
increasing one's market share one had a better control of the market and pricing.").
95. Id. at 2483 (Regal was successful in several of its product lines at maintaining an "orderly
market" through its leadership); see also id. at app. 352-76 (report to Copperweld concerning Regal's
marketing strategies).
96. Id. at app. 598 (letter of Phillip Smith: "I still remain convinced, however, that there is plenty
we can do to block Grohne [from going into business].").
97. Id. at 353, 6778-79.
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record of "price leadership" 98 to bring prices back in line with Regal's
profit objectives. 99 Only when lower price levels persisted and Copper-
weld's attempts to buy out Independence failed' ° was Regal forced to
conform by lowering its prices.101 Obviously, superior efficiency alone
does not explain the exclusion of Independence from the steel tubing
market.
Neither the trial court opinion nor the trial record and exhibits demon-
strates that the steel tubing market was competitive. Independence's ability
to enter the market and reduce prices on three occasions indicates, to the
contrary, that pricing was not previously equated with marginal cost. More
importantly, pricing was not determined by competitive rivalry. Copper-
weld's testimony substantiates this fact.10 2
Moreover, the record does not reveal any efficiency objective that would
justify Copperweld's and Regal's threats to the suppliers. 103 Their allegedly
valid business concerns about trade secrets, customer lists, and the hiring
of their employees by Independence seem to have been manufactured
concerns with no real basis in fact. 104 The parent and subsidiary were, as
the trial record indicates, attempting to erect barriers to entry in order to
preserve their share of an uncompetitive market and maintain Regal's
position as a price leader.
The Seventh Circuit, accordingly, found sufficient evidence of unrea-
sonable anticompetitive effect to sustain the trial court's findings. 05 Econ-
omists examined the market demand, price, and cost of manufacturing and
determined that Independence had lost profits totaling $8,298,245.106
98. Id. at 2484 (deposition of Smith [Copperweld C.E.O]: A price leader is a company who when
they move up or down in prices, the other people who are in the market either go up or down after
them."). For a more complete discussion of the effects of "price leadership" and its relationship to
other collusive practices, see P. SAMUELSON, supra note 7, at 484 ("[I]f sellers are few, and if they are
large relative to the total demand, not very fearful of new entrants, and keenly conscious of the
mutuality of their interest, the tacit price pattern may become a very high one relative to long-run or
short-run marginal cost.").
99. Record at 2480-81, 2896-99, 2905, Copperweld.
100. Brief for Independence Corp. at 7, Copperweld.
101. Record at 2905-06, 3914-16, Copperiveld.
102. See supra notes 94-101.
103. If there was an underlying efficiency justification, Copperweld and Regal failed to expose it.
The parent and subsidiary desired, on the contrary, to prevent the entry of a formidable competitor into
the structural steel tubing market. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
104. Record at app. 677, Copperweld (there are no trade secrets in the manufacturing of welded
steel tubing, everyone in the business knows who the customers are, and the majority of people in the
business have worked for two or more competing companies).
105. Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310,323 (7th Cir. 1982), rev'd. 104
S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
106. Id. at 329-31 (the jury awarded damages totaling $2,449,099).
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The belief that markets are purely competitive and the conclusion that
predatory tactics, oligopoly, attempted barriers to entry, and even collusion
do not occur in a rational world is at odds with the factual scenario
presented in Copperweld. The facts presented in previous cases that have
utilized the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine also contradict these as-
sumptions. 107 The "eminently sound" reasons that persuaded the Court to
reject the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine and leave a "gap" in anti-
trust enforcement appear less sound in light of the factual scenario pre-
sented in Copperweld.
IV. THE NEW PER SE RULE OF NONLIABILITY: SOME
CRITICISMS AND SUGGESTED REFORMS
A. The Manipulation of Economic Modeling
The Copperweld Court's reliance on economic models poses three
problems. First, the theoretical component of market modeling is un-
proven; it consists merely of generalizations about the way that markets
operate and individuals behave.108 As this case demonstrates, even eco-
107. Similarities between the occurrences in Copperweld and those in previous intra-enterprise
conspiracy cases reveal a common thread; namely, the doctrine has been used primarily to police
coercive actions of firms with a significant degree of market power. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc.
v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) (dealers who accepted and acquiesced in the
exclusive dealing and resale price maintenance schemes did not do so voluntarily. Rather, the
advantages that the parent and subsidiary were able to secure were a function of their market power);
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211,213 (195 1) (evidence showed that
a subsidiary that normally followed a separate pricing policy had been coerced by its affiliated
corporation into supporting a boycott of a distributor); Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States,
334 U.S. 110, 116 (1948) (motion picture theater chain used monopoly power generated by its ownership
of theaters in "one theater" towns, to obtain advantages over competitors in "open" cities); United
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 101-04 (1948) (theater coercion); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332
U.S. 218, 224-25 (1947) (firm with monopoly in taxicab industry coerced cab companies into
purchasing cabs from a subsidiary); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 178-79
(1944) (theater coercion); United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376,398-403 (7th Cir. 1941)
(General Motors Corp. and its wholly owned subsidiary, G.M. Financing Corp., threatened to revoke
independent dealership outlets in order to coerce dealers into accepting GMAC financing. Most dealers
could not afford the consequences of losing a lifetime investment and acceeded to the demands.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941); see also ATToRNEY GENERAL'S REP. supra note 9, at 33-34.
108. The Chicago model is frequently criticized because it invokes a static price theory analysis.
Static models ignore all of the dynamic variables that exist in an actual market. See, e.g., Sullivan,
Antitrust, Micro-economics, and Politics: Reflections on Some Recent Relationships, 68 CAL. L. REv.
1, 10 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Sullivan, Recent Relationships]; Sullivan, Economics and More
Humanistic Disciplines: What are the Sources of WisdomforAntitrust, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1214, 1216
(1977) (the Chicago model assumes that markets work with supreme efficiency) [hereinafter cited as
Sullivan, Economics]; Foreword: On the Road with 'Chicago School' Antitrust and Those Who Don't
Like It, 13 ANTrrRusT L. & EcON. REv. 1,5 (1981). One significant dynamic variable that static models
ignore is technological innovation, which some economists contend is more likely to be generated in
small firms as opposed to large firms. See P. SAMuELsoN, supra note 7, at 488-89.
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nomic experts can reach different conclusions when viewing the same set
of facts. Second, the assumptions made determine, in large part, the result
achieved. Thus, the economic models can be manipulated by changing the
underlying philosophical component. 109 The Chicago school's belief that
single-firm conduct is harmless has philosophical origins that emphasize
freedom of individual action and a minimum of government interference in
market transactions.'1 10 This philosophical orientation conflicts with the
philosophy of the Sherman Act, which stresses the need for government
intervention in the marketplace. Finally, these models can be deceivingly
persuasive. They appear capable of providing rational solutions to any
conceivable problem. I"'
In the final analysis, economic models cannot replace legal reasoning. " 2
Easily manipulated models founded on unproven generalizations are a
precarious foundation for judicial evaluation of antitrust law. The policy
choices that must be made between income allocation and efficiency and
between the diffusion of economic and political power and efficiency
should be made explicitly. The Supreme Court should not bury these
judgments in a host of economic assumptions. The Court should not
abdicate these crucial policy choices to any group of economic theorists.
The Court, after all, may choose the wrong theory from among competing
paradigms. 113
B. Toward a Flexible Analysis
The Court in Copperweld attempted to reform the inconsistent applica-
tion of section 1 doctrine by adopting a new per se rule of nonliability for
parent and subsidiary corporations. The result, however, was merely to
substitute an inflexible approach for an inconsistent approach. The Copper-
weld Court's per se rule divests courts of the power to assess, on a case by
case basis, the two questions underlying section 1 intra-enterprise conspir-
acy cases: first, whether it is desirable, given the accepted legislative
objectives, to control the conduct presented in a particular case; and
second, whether the intra-enterprise doctrine is an appropriate control
109. Sullivan, Recent Relationships, supra note 108, at 12 ("[Elconomic theories are not simply
means for analyzing problems. Each theory comes linked to a particular view of the world, to a set of
convictions about what is important.").
110. Posner, supra note 81, at 609 n.67 (a "deep distrust of government intervention . . . is
associated with the Chicago School of Economics"); Sullivan, Recent Relationships, supra note 108, at
5 (describing the underlying political ideology as "eighteenth century liberalism").
I 11. Sullivan, Recent Relationships, supra note 108, at 9.
112. Flynn, Rethinking Sherman Act Section I Analysis: Three Proposalsfor Reducing the Chaos,
49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1593, 1598 (1980); Sullivan, Recent Relationships, supra note 108, at 12.
113. Sullivan, Economics, supra note 108, at 1223-32 (suggesting that the assumptions of the
Chicago school may be wrong).
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mechanism in the given circumstances. The new per se rule of nonliability
for single entities under section 1 of the Sherman Act is insensitive to the
myriad of economic, political and social variables that should govern the
analysis of whether a particular action effects an "unreasonable" restraint
of trade.
An alternative to the per se rule is the rule of reason approach, which
prevailed before Copperweld. 114 This approach should establish evidenti-
ary presumptions and allocate the burden of proof. 115 The rule of reason
approach, by itself, will not identify and expose the policy choices made by
the Court.
The approach can, however, provide flexibility and accountability if
applied in conjunction with a tort-like analysis of the duty owed and risk
taken. 116 A flexible and open balancing approach is appropriate because it
reserves the ultimate resolution of political questions to Congress. By
revealing the legislative policies on which they rely, the courts would
subject themselves to legislative review. Moreover, a flexible balancing
approach is capable of meeting the threats posed by new forms of undue
restraints of trade. 117
To meet this need, Congress should draft new legislation explicitly
covering the single-firm restraints of trade exempted by the Copperweld
Court. I The legislation should carefully define the intended policy objec-
tives, in particular the desired relationship between competitiveness and
efficiency. The courts, for their part, must weigh the risk of anticompetitive
effect inherent in the defendant's action and the extent of the harm realized
114. See supra note 26.
115. Flynn, supra note 112, at 1599.
116. Id. at 1600-01; Sullivan, Economics, supra note 108, at 1229-30 (the traditional approach to
antitrust analysis has invoked "tort concepts and methodologies").
117. A current "gap" problem not reachable under § 2 of the Sherman Act is the practice of
raising barriers to entry in oligopolistic markets; specifically, practices such as excessive advertising
and annual style changes act to exclude would-be competitors from entering the market. See L.
SuLLIvAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrrRusT § 114, at 324 (1977).
118. Such legislation might provide:
No person shall engage in any activity the effect of which is to substantially lessen competition or
unreasonably restrain trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations.
Provided, that any activity promoting or tending to promote the efficient use or allocation of
resources shall raise a rebuttable presumption that the activity does not substantially lessen
competition or unreasonably restrain trade or commerce.
Such legislation should be accompanied by a policy section explicitly detailing the desired tradeoff
between the goals of efficiency and competitiveness. This Note does not attempt to suggest where this
line should be drawn. This is a question that must be resolved by Congress. However, the above
language is suggested for three reasons. First, it extends antitrust liability to corporations and their
subsidiaries, divisions, and officers and eliminates the purely formal distinction drawn by the Court.
Second, it provides that any claim of an efficiency justification must first be established and may not be
presumed as was done in Copperweld. Finally, by providing a rebuttable presumption, the suggested
language allows the incorporation of goals other than efficiency.
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against any benefits that might have resulted or might have been expected to
result from the action. 119 The courts should undertake an analysis of the
challenged restraint of trade by asking whether a duty to refrain from
injurious anticompetitive behavior should be imposed upon the firm and its
subsidiary or division. This approach should be analogous to the traditional
proximate cause analysis in tort litigation. 120
The action would be analyzed in the context of predetermined policy
objectives, and the balancing of risks and benefits could be done in general
terms. This would avoid the objections of economists who assert that the
precise tradeoff between competitiveness and efficiency cannot be mea-
sured. 121
This solution requires tradeoffs. Businesses would endure a period of
uncertainty as to what restraints of trade violate the Sherman Act as
amended. However, increased uncertainty would be offset by the benefits
of open balancing of the relevant antitrust concerns. In Copperweld, the
Court was reluctant to accept this uncertainty for fear it would inhibit
vigorous competition. 122 The relevant consideration is not, however,
whether uncertainty is created, but whether the cost of uncertainty out-
weighs the corresponding enforcement benefits. 123
Moreover, the degree of uncertainty generated by the application of
section 1 's limitations to "single entities" is overstated in Copperweld.
Several mitigating factors reduce the importance of this concern. First,
firms frequently are aware that their actions cross the line of vigorous
competition. The Copperweld Corporation, for example, was clearly ad-
vised of this possibility by its attorneys. 124 Second, the courts have inter-
preted the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine narrowly and it has been
infrequently used as an enforcement tool. 125 The degree of uncertainty
119. The dissent in Copperweld urges that this type of balancing approach be applied in § I
analysis. See 104 S. Ct. at 2746 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 42 (5th ed. 1984). The
question of proximate cause is closely analogous to a determination of legally imposed duty of care.
Ultimately, both questions involve a policy judgment of whether "the law will extend the responsibility
for the conduct to the consequences which have in fact occurred." Id. at 273.
121. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
123. See Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2751-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (because the Court's per se
rule of nonliability creates a gap in antitrust enforcement, it must be rejected as inconsistent with the
Act's intent, despite any uncertainty that it creates). But see Note, "Conspiring Entities" Under Section
I of the Sherman Act, 95 HARV. L. Rev. 661, 664-65 (1982) (the costs of uncertainty outweigh
enforcement benefits).
124. Record at app. 622, Copperweld (letter from Copperweld's attorneys to Copperweld's CEO:
"We must be careful not to open ourselves up to an antitrust suit by Grohne that we have harassed
potential financial and equipment suppliers from doing business with him, thus restricting competi-
tion. ").
125. Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 24, at 30-35.
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generated by a single-firm restraint of trade provision could, similarly, be
limited by a judicious application. Third, uncertainty would decrease as
courts determine which patterns of conduct violate section 1. This appears
to have occurred, to an extent, in the previous Supreme Court cases on
intra-enterprise conspiracy. 126 Finally, it must be recognized that uncer-
tainty exists for all business planning activity. Firms have been able to
integrate the risks of products liability into the business calculus. By
analogy, they ought to be able to adapt to the risks of antitrust liability by
accepting this risk as a cost of doing business. 127 If all firms face the same
risks and costs, the more efficient firms will be at a competitive advantage
over their inefficient rivals and the market will have incorporated this
externally imposed cost.
V. CONCLUSION
When courts interpret section 1 and other antitrust provisions they must
provide a clear antitrust analysis soundly rooted in an accurate assessment
of the statutory intent. The goal of consistent antitrust enforcement should
not be affected by a court's preference for business autonomy or vigorous
antitrust enforcement. Scholars have interpreted the Sherman Act in en-
tirely inconsistent ways. Courts, therefore, must be clear and explicit in
interpreting the Act. Particularly where legislative interpretation is con-
cerned, a court should not defer crucial public policy choices to particular
economic paradigms.
Neither can a court abdicate its responsibility for implementing inten-
tionally vague and inherently flexible antitrust legislation. The Supreme
Court's adoption of a strict conspiracy construction of section 1 fails to
address the problems posed in Copperweld, and closes all avenues for
pursuing restraints of trade brought about by oligopolistic market struc-
tures. 128 The new restraint of trade provision must specify the underlying
policies that are fundamental to the question of whether an action "unrea-
sonably" restrains trade. The new provision should also be flexible. Since
126. See supra note 107.
127. This analogy is useful but not perfect. Finns can plan for products liability by purchasing
insurance. While insurance cannot be purchased in the antitrust context, firms are still able to plan for
antitrust risk. If a firm does not wish to incur this risk it will plan accordingly. Some firms may view the
potential to make short run monopoly profits as outweighing this risk and undertake anticompetitiv
activity regardless of the consequences.
128. See, e.g., L. SuLuwvA, supra note 117, at 324.
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the Court appears unwilling to apply the Sherman Act flexibly to meet the
changing demands of the American marketplace, Congress must require
the Court to do so by enacting new legislation.
S. John Goodwin
